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REPLY TO JACK CAPUTO
Merold Westphal

I first thank Jack Caputo for his superb summary of my position, then call
attention to sin as an epistemological category in Aquinas, the (largely undeveloped) resource for a Pauline hermeneutics of suspicion. There follow clarifications of my understanding of Derrida's atheism and of my suggestion that
he is a natural law theorist. Finally, I argue that my own position of a faith
that cannot convert itself into sight a) places no a priori constraints on what we
can say about God, however traditional or bizarre, but only on the metaclaims we make about our beliefs, and b) that we do not become more radical
by diminishing the substantive content of our belief.

Jack begins his comments with an extended summary of what he takes
to be the heart of my view, a methodological postmodernism that is a double hermeneutics: a hermeneutics of finitude whose theological correlate is
the doctrine of creation and whose form is that of a post-Hegelian
Kantianism, and a hermeneutics of suspicion whose theological correlate is
the doctrine of the fall and which draws not only on the great modern “secular theologians of original sin,” as I like to call Marx, Freud, Nietzsche,
and Sartre, but also on the Pauline tradition about the noetic effects of sin
as it reaches through Augustine, Luther, and Calvin to Kierkegaard. This
account states what I am up to with great clarity and accuracy and I am
most grateful for it. I wish I had written it myself.
My only quibble about these opening pages concerns not myself but
Aquinas. In a recent colloquy with Richard Kearney, he expressed the suspicion that I, the Protestant, would be more sympathetic to Aquinas than
he, the Catholic; and he was right. Now, as if replaying that scene, I want
to put in a good word for the “angelic” doctor. He, too, and not just the
Luther and Calvin, knows about the noetic effects of sin. He speaks of
human reason, “wherein is mortal sin,” as in need of restoration by justifying grace and continues that “since man’s reason is not entirely subject to
God, the consequence is that many disorders occur in the acts itself of reason” (ST I-II, Q. 109, A. 8). This is why natural law, which depends solely
on human reason, is in need of divine law, given through revelation.
Human reason participates in “the dictate of divine reason . . . imperfectly”
(ST I-II, Q. 91, A. 3). Nor is this merely a matter of finitude. “But when
man turned his back on God, he fell under the influence of his sensual
impulses.” This departure from the path and the law of reason leaves us
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with “reason bereft of its vigor” (Q. 91, A. 6). This means that “reason is
perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature” so that
“the natural law was so perverted in the hearts of some men . . . that they
esteemed those things good which are naturally evil” (Q. 94, A 4-5). There
is even a social dimension to all this. In a passage that is perhaps as close
as Aquinas ever gets to Marx and Nietzsche, he writes that “the secondary
precepts [of] the natural law can be blotted out from the human heart,
either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in
respect of necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits”
(Q. 94, A. 6).
I don’t deny that Aquinas does not give the emphasis to this
Pauline/Augustinian theme that Luther, Calvin, and Kierkegaard will give
to it, and no doubt this has made it possible for all too many Thomists to
ignore it all but completely. But it is there, and I believe that a Thomism
that is faithful to its biblical sources and to the phenomenological evidence
will develop this theme more fully than the possibly too angelic doctor
himself.
Over against my “quibble” about Aquinas, Jack has two “refinements” to
offer about my treatment of Derrida.. What a gentleman! As to Derrida’s
atheism, I have read his account in recent interviews in which he explains
why he says he “rightly passes for an atheist,” and I would now speak in a
more qualified way about his relation to atheism. I like the suggestion that
what Johannes Climacus calls becoming a Christian could also be described
as rightly passing for a Christian. Still, it seems to me that a familiar scene is
being replayed here, the scene in which one who self-identifies as an agnostic seeks to distinguish that stance from atheism. The difference between
the two reduces significantly when one notices that the agnostic acts like the
atheist far more than like the believer: does not pray, does not read the
Bible, does not participate with a worshiping community, etc. I know that
Derrida tells us that he prays, and I am not simply identifying him with this
agnostic. But it does seem to me that he talks far more like an unbeliever
than like a believer and that while he isn’t a dogmatic atheist he isn’t exactly
neutral either. His discussions of the Chora are a case in point, for they seem
to suggest the primacy of unmeaning and the void. In addition, there is his
insistence that messianism be without a Messiah and that justice will never
be actual. If the God of theism is real there just might be a Messiah and a
Kingdom of God in which justice is fully actual. Jack himself shortly
describes Derrida’s appeal to a justice that is not constructed and therefore
not deconstructible as “without God or nature.”
On Derrida as a natural law theorist, I confess to using this title
(“Derrida as Natural Law Theorist,” in Overcoming Onto-Theology) in a
playful and provocative manner, but I am also serious about it. I think the
difference between Jack and me, if any, on this point, is less than it at first
seems. I do not intend to identify Derrida with any particular earlier version of natural law theory but merely note that he thinks we should make
moral appeal to a justice that is superior to and never reducible to positive
law (or the prevailing moral ethos).This does not require the simple identification of nature with essence and with universal rule. I am in fact sympathetic with the arguments from Aristotle (“the decision rests with percep-
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tion”) to Derrida and Carol Gilligan that singularity must not be obliterated in universality, and while I don’t think a fully nominalist alternative to
hard-core essentialism is the best one, I am content to leave that matter as a
debate among those I would consider natural law theorists. Taking a cue
from Jack’s suggestion, we might take “nature” to signify the singular as
much as the typical.
When I suggest that Derrida seeks to “articulate the idea of a higher law
to which every human code is answerable in a conceptual framework not
constituted (or constricted) by those ideals”, namely those of episteme, scientia, and Wissenschaft, the emphasis falls on the idea. I know that Derrida
does not think that we can articulate justice in full innocence of those
ideals, which have shaped us in ways we do not suspect and cannot erase.
But what I think he is trying to do in “Force of Law” is to articulate the idea
of a higher law or norm to which all actual moral and legal codes are
answerable without tying the idea of such a “natural law” to what he, and
Jack, and I take to be illusory epistemic ideals.
Since Jack enjoys having fun while doing philosophy as at least as much
as I do, I have suggested that he follow up Radical Hermeneutics, and More
Radical Hermeneutics, following the cultural wisdom of Hollywood, with a
prequel entitled Not So Very Damn Radical Hermeneutics. Now, since no
good deed goes unpunished, he suggests that I have already written just
that book. Several comments:
1) The upshot of my argument is that we are free “to believe in the God
of metaphysical theology . . . an infinite eternal omnipotent omniscient creator of heaven and earth.” Yes, but with two important qualifications.
First, so far as I am concerned, the ongoing debate over whether and if so
how to attribute these “perfections” to God is a legitimate and important
debate and not one I take to be settled. Moreover, the goal is not to create
an ideal metaphysical system but to be faithful to biblical revelation so far
as is humanly possible. This means, second, that such abstract metaphysical categories as those just mentioned must be teleologically suspended in
the personal, moral notions of a God who loves, who cares, who invites,
who suffers, and who gets angry. I see no reason for smirking in the
notion that the world is a system for God but cannot be for us, since the
onto-theological aspiration was precisely to make it a system for us.
2) Second, I agree that Derrida cannot silence Shirley MacLaine, but
being free to believe does not mean that one is necessarily entitled to
believe. It only means that a certain theory or cluster of theories does not
settle the question of belief negatively. To the best of my knowledge no
one has suggested that Derrida could silence Shirley MacLaine, so an argument to the effect that he can’t would be a bit quixotic. But it has been
widely suggested by friend and foe alike, that various postmodern philosophical theories and biblical Christian faith are incompatible. My argument is that they are not, that when certain themes are separated from the
secular context in which they appear but to which they are not conceptually
tied, they can be appropriated by theistic faith in general and Christian
faith in particular. Being “free” of this or that particular objection provides
no guarantee or security for faith, and in this sense, while the argument, to
the degree that it is successful, makes faith “safe” from a particular (set of)
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objection(s), it does not make faith in general safe but leaves it as risky as it
appears to Kierkegaard.
3) This risk means that there are no guarantees or final assurances that
this understanding of Christianity is superior to that version, or that
Christianity is a better take on the real than Judaism or Hinduism, or that
religion generically is superior to secularism generically. Jack writes,
“There is no way to settle the undecidable fluctuation among the several
faiths, or between the several faiths and a non-religious view of things.” I
agree, and with Johannes Climacus recognize faith as inextricably linked
with “objective uncertainty.” But, as Jack himself is fond of insisting,
undecidability calls for decision, and I see no reason for saying that the
decision of a faith that finds religion more compelling than secularism,
that finds this religion more compelling that those religions, and that finds
this version of this religion more compelling than other versions should be
discredited as insufficiently radical unless radicality is defined in terms of
minimal commitment. But that, it seems to me, would beg the question.
4) As to the self being at odds with itself rather than a “dull monovocal
settled self-identity,” I am quite in agreement. “I believe; help my unbelief”
(Mark 9:24). But is that a reason for me to believe less than I do, less than I
am trying to believe, less than what I rightly pass for believing?
5) Finally, with respect to God, I do not deny “the possibility that the
world is not known comprehensively by anyone and that no one knows
[that] we are here.” My faith in God is just that, faith and not knowledge.
But I did not need postmodernism to teach me that. As far back as I can
remember I have believed that “we walk by faith, not by sight” (2 Cor. 5:7).
I have never found proofs for the existence of God or other apologetic
arguments in support of faith to be knockdown arguments giving apodictic certainty rather than prima facie plausibility at best. It may well be that
we should think about God more as Jack does than as I do. But I fail to see
in the Je ne sais pas. Il faut croire of Jacques and Jack any reason to think so.
Fordham University

